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9 Abstract
10 In judgment and decision making tasks, people tend to neglect the overall frequency of
11 base-rates when they estimate the probability of an event; this is known as the base-rate fal-
12 lacy. In causal learning, despite peoples accuracy at judging causal strength according to one
13 or other normative model (i.e., Power PC, DP), they tend to misperceive base-rate information
14 (e.g., the cause density eﬀect). The present study investigates the relationship between causal
15 learning and decision making by asking whether people weight base-rate information in the
16 same way when estimating causal strength and when making judgments or inferences about
17 the likelihood of an event. The results suggest that people diﬀer according to the weight they
18 place on base-rate information, but the way individuals do this is consistent across causal and
19 decision making tasks. We interpret the results as reﬂecting a tendency to diﬀerentially weight
20 base-rate information which generalizes to a variety of tasks. Additionally, this study provides
21 evidence that causal learning and decision making share some component processes.
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26 1. Introduction
27 There are two research domains in which people are explicitly required, on the ba-
28 sis of some evidence, to evaluate the association between two events [X (cause) and Y
29 (eﬀect)], and predict from this the likelihood of event Y given event X: causal induc-
30 tion and Bayesian decision making. In one, the task environment typically involves
31 gathering evidence on a trial by trial basis (causal induction task), that is, people
32 actually experience the relationship between the events across time. In the other, peo-
33 ple are merely presented summarized data in the form of a one-shot problem (Bayes-
34 ian decision making task). For both types of task, an accurate response involves
35 integrating two forms of probabilistic information: the background data (base-rate)
36 and the indicant or diagnostic information (likelihood ratio). Typically, what has
37 been found is that people are insuﬃciently sensitive to base-rate information and fail
38 to adequately incorporate it in their decision making and reasoning. The aim of this
39 article is to examine what, if any, are the relations between causal induction and deci-
40 sion making with particular emphasis on peoples use of base-rate information in
41 causal and decision making tasks.
42 1.1. Causal induction
43 When people are asked to judge the relationship between two binary variables,
44 they should normatively consider four diﬀerent sources of evidence, that is, the fre-
45 quency with which the two variables co-occurred (Cell A), the frequency with which
46 each variable occurred in the absence of the other (Cells B and C), and the frequency
47 with which both were absent (Cell D). The contingency table (see Table 1) summa-
48 rizes the frequencies with which the various events occur.
49 For example, in order to determine the extent to which one type of radiation
50 causes butterﬂies to mutate, a simple way of calculating the degree of contingency
51 between the putative cause (e.g., radiation X) and its eﬀect (e.g., mutation) is to
52 use the DP rule (Allan, 1980) where
DP ¼ pðejcÞ  pðej:cÞ ð1Þ
55 By examining the A and B cells of the contingency table, it is possible to determine
56 the proportion A/(A + B), which is simply the probability of the eﬀect e in the pres-
57 ence of the cause c expressed as p(ejc) in the DP rule. In contrast, pðej:cÞ refers to
58 the proportion C/(C + D), which is the probability of the eﬀect in the absence of the
59 cause. Intuitively, we can see that the extent to which p(ejc) exceeds pðej:cÞ gives
Table 1
Representation of information in a contingency table
Candidate cause Eﬀect
Present Absent
Present A B
Absent C D
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60 some indication of the causal strength of the relationship between radiation and but-
61 terﬂy mutation.
62 Alternatively, causal strength can be calculated by using the Power PC rule (e.g.,
63 Buehner & Cheng, 1997; Cheng, 1997):
P ¼ pðejcÞ  pðej:cÞ
1 pðej:cÞ ð2Þ
67 This rule is an alternative normative description of causal strength that seeks to dif-
68 ferentiate causation from covariation. To estimate the causal strength of a candidate
69 cause to produce an eﬀect, the model takes into account alternative candidate causes
70 of the same eﬀect. This is done by integrating DP and the base-rate of the eﬀect
71 pðej:cÞ. The main prediction that follows from Eq. (2) is that if two candidate
72 cause–eﬀect pairings result in equal DP but diﬀerent values of pðej:cÞ, then the cau-
73 sal judgments will be diﬀerent, and these will vary in accordance with pðej:cÞ: as the
74 latter increases (but is not equal to 1) so does the judged generative power of the
75 cause. Diﬀerences between the contingency and power rule become evident once
76 the probability of the eﬀect in the absence of the cause is greater than 0. In the pres-
77 ent study, we do not take any position on the relative merits of these two rules or of
78 the claims each of them can make to being normative. This issue has been widely dis-
79 cussed elsewhere (see Shanks, 2004, for a review).
80 Studies of causal induction suggest that people, although on the whole, good at
81 judging causal strength according to one or the other rule, tend to exhibit biased
82 behavior when making inferences from contingency tables and in trial-by-trial learn-
83 ing tasks (e.g., Allan & Jenkins, 1980; Smedslund, 1963; Valle´e-Tourangeau, Hol-
84 lingsworth, & Murphy, 1998; Ward & Jenkins, 1965). For example, studies show
85 that people weight cell information, non-normatively, in the order A > B > C > D
86 (Kao & Wasserman, 1992; Mandel & Lehman, 1998). Hence, people are most sensi-
87 tive to variations in cell A and tend to overestimate the value of this cell, whereas
88 they are least sensitive to variations in cell D, often underestimating its value (Arkes
89 & Harkness, 1983; Valle´e-Tourangeau et al., 1998; Wasserman, Dorner, & Koa,
90 1990). Normatively, the cells should be weighted equally. In addition, when pre-
91 sented with conditions in which the eﬀect is equally likely in the presence or absence
92 of the cause (DP = 0) but the overall base-rate of the eﬀect increases, people misper-
93 ceive a contingency that is not there, known as the cause density eﬀect (Buehner,
94 Cheng, & Cliﬀord, 2003; Perales & Shanks, 2003; Smedslund, 1963; Valle´e-Touran-
95 geau et al., 1998). This is not to say that people are unable to discriminate between
96 positive, negative, and zero correlations—they can in fact do this well (e.g., Shanks,
97 1995; Valle´e-Tourangeau et al., 1998). However, in zero correlation conditions peo-
98 ple fail to take suﬃcient account of the base-rate of the eﬀect and so tend to overes-
99 timate causal strength.
100 1.2. Bayesian decision making
101 We turn now to another type of situation in which people have to predict an out-
102 come or the probability of an outcome in light of evidence, and in which they tend to
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103 show biased behavior when reasoning about base-rate information. Typically, in
104 Bayesian decision making tasks, people are asked to judge the likelihood of an event
105 having occurred or that will occur. If they respond normatively, they will integrate
106 base-rates and the likelihood ratio according to Bayes rule. In Bayes rule the prob-
107 ability of the hypothesis tested (h) is derived by multiplying the likelihood ratio of the
108 observed datum (d) by the prior probability favoring the focal hypothesis:
pðhjdÞ
pð:hjdÞ ¼
pðdjhÞ
pðdj:hÞ 
pðhÞ
pð:hÞ
111 What is summarized in the rule is that the diagnosticity of the likelihood ratio should
112 be evaluated independently of the prior odds favoring the focal hypothesis. To do
113 this, the rule includes three ratio terms. The far right term refers to the prior odds
114 favoring the focal hypothesis. The middle term refers to the likelihood ratio com-
115 posed of the probability of the data given the focal hypothesis divided by the prob-
116 ability of the data given its mutually exclusive component. The far left term
117 represents the posterior odds favoring the focal hypothesis after receipt of the new
118 data.
119 Numerous studies show that people tend not to give responses that obey Bayes
120 rule; instead, they predominantly make two types of error. First, people routinely ne-
121 glect the denominator of the likelihood ratio pðdj:hÞ, that is, they show a preference
122 for information in which the probability of the datum given the focal hypothesis is
123 true rather than false (Beyth-Marom & Fischhoﬀ, 1983; Doherty, Chadwick, Gara-
124 van, Barr, & Mynatt, 1996; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978; Wasserman et al., 1990). To
125 illustrate, Doherty and Mynatt (1990) presented participants with a problem in
126 which they were asked to determine whether a patient had the disease Digirosa. Par-
127 ticipants were asked to select cards which contained information that would be rel-
128 evant in making their diagnosis: % of people with Digirosa p(h), % of people
129 without Digirosa pð:hÞ, % of people with Digirosa who have a red rash p(djh),
130 and % of people without Digirosa who have a red rash pðdj:hÞ. To solve the task
131 correctly, the cards p(djh), pðdj:hÞ, and p(h) corresponding to the terms in the for-
132 mula are required; pð:hÞ is the complement of p(h) and so it is not necessary to cal-
133 culate the posterior probability.
134 Doherty and Mynatt (1990) found that, consistent with much of the judgment lit-
135 erature, few participants (11%) demonstrated an understanding of Bayesian reason-
136 ing by selecting the correct information. The least popular card choices were the
137 prior probability p(h) and pðdj:hÞ. To evaluate a target hypothesis, alternative
138 hypotheses must be considered, and Doherty and Mynatt proposed that participants
139 adopting a good hypothesis testing strategy would select the card pðdj:hÞ because it
140 indicates an awareness of alternative hypotheses. A later study by Stanovich and
141 West (1998) reported that participants choosing pðdj:hÞ in Doherty and Mynatts
142 (1990) disease problem scored higher on tests of cognitive ability and a battery of
143 reasoning tasks (e.g., syllogisms, conditional reasoning tasks, probability based
144 problems) compared with those that had excluded this card from their choices.
145 The second type of error people make is to neglect or underweight base-rate infor-
146 mation (Bar-Hillel, 1980; Doherty & Mynatt, 1990; Fischhoﬀ & Bar-Hillel, 1984;
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147 Tversky & Kahneman, 1982). For example, in Kahneman and Tverskys (1973) clas-
148 sic task participants are presented a short cover story: 85% of cabs in a particular city
149 are green and the remainder are blue. A witness identiﬁes a cab involved in an acci-
150 dent as blue. Under tests, the witness correctly identiﬁes both blue and green cabs on
151 80% of the occasions. Participants are then asked: What is the probability that the
152 cab was in fact blue? The posterior probability is in fact 0.41, however, few respond
153 with this answer, tending instead to give estimates that range between 0.70 and 0.90.
154 This highly robust ﬁnding has been taken as evidence of peoples reliance on errone-
155 ous intuitions such as the degree of correspondence between a sample and a popu-
156 lation (the ‘‘representativeness’’ heuristic). Thus, people are sensitive to the
157 diagnosticity of the descriptions in the cover story, but disregard the fact that the dif-
158 ferent sub-classes are of diﬀerent sizes (e.g., 85% green cabs vs. 15% blue cabs).
159 Bar-Hillels (1980) alternative interpretation of Kahneman and Tverskys results
160 suggests that the fallacy is the result of misperceiving the relevance of such informa-
161 tion. There is evidence to suggest that base-rate information can be made more rel-
162 evant when framed in such a way that it has a direct causal relation to the target
163 information (Ajzen, 1977; Tversky & Kahneman, 1980). In tasks like the cab prob-
164 lem base-rate information is presented as incidental to the main focus of the prob-
165 lem, whereas contexts that increase the causal eﬃcacy of base-rate information
166 and therefore its status in the problem helps to attenuate base-rate neglect. Bar-Hillel
167 (1980) claimed that such contexts clarify the relation between the base-rate and a
168 target case enabling both types of information to become integrated. Formally the
169 versions that Bar-Hillel used in her study were the same as Kahneman and Tverskys,
170 but used causal contexts. Students were presented with a cover story which discussed
171 suicide rates: A study was done on causes of suicide among young adults (aged 25–
172 35). It was found that the percentage of suicides is three times larger among single
173 than married people. In this age group, 80% are married and 20% are single. In
174 one version of this task students were simply asked to estimate the likelihood of sui-
175 cide in a given sub-population in which the posterior probability was 0.43. Bar-Hillel
176 found that through various modiﬁcations to the framing of this task base-rate
177 neglect could be reduced from 85% of responses to 25%. Changes to the framing in-
178 cluded varying the base rate information and likelihood ratio. However, Bar-Hillels
179 study demonstrates that it is not causality per se that reduces base-rate neglect, but
180 rather the relevancy it adds to this type of information, and so other contexts that do
181 this are also able to attenuate base-rate neglect.
182 Evidence of deviations from Bayesian reasoning, such as base-rate neglect, have
183 been the cause of much debate, raising questions about the appropriateness of tasks
184 studying peoples probabilistic reasoning (Kohler, 1996) and whether people are able
185 to reason rationally (Kahneman & Tversky, 1996; Shaﬁr, 1993). Similarly, in causal
186 induction it is unclear why people should diﬀerentially weight the cells of a contin-
187 gency table. Some have argued that this in fact implies an underlying bias for posi-
188 tive or conﬁrmatory evidence (Klayman & Ha, 1987; Mandel & Lehman, 1998).
189 However, others suggest that the biases that have been found are inﬂated by the par-
190 ticular choice of framing in which a task is couched or the phrasing of causal ques-
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191 tions, rather than being an unavoidable property of peoples causal judgments (e.g.,
192 Beyth-Marom, 1982; Crocker, 1981; Perales & Shanks, 2003; Valle´e-Tourangeau
193 et al., 1998; Waldmann, 2001; White, 2003). These mixed ﬁndings can also be seen
194 as representing a broader controversy between prescriptive (or normative) and
195 descriptive explanations of non-normative behavior. That is, are deviations from
196 normative models (e.g., Bayes rule, DP rule, Power PC model) examples of biased
197 information processing behavior, or the product of a cognitive system with limited
198 computational capacity?
199 Stanovich and Wests (2000) work on individual diﬀerences attempts to answer
200 this question. They showed that peoples performance deviates systematically from
201 that which is prescribed by normative models (i.e., logic, probability calculus, ex-
202 pected utility theory). They proposed that the underlying basis for these deviations
203 has strong implications for the way in which the relationship between descriptive
204 and normative models is understood. One is that there are instances in which peo-
205 ples behavior is far from optimal, and that poor performance on reasoning tasks
206 provides evidence of irrational tendencies inherent in human behavior (e.g., Nisbett
207 & Ross, 1993; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Alternatively, individuals may simply
208 fail to perform well because of cognitive constraints such as resource limitations
209 of the human cognitive apparatus (e.g., Baron, 1985; Oaksford & Chater, 1993). Fi-
210 nally, individuals performance might be consistent with a diﬀerent normative model
211 to that prescribed by the experimenter (e.g., Kohler, 1996), or the normative model
212 used to assess responses to a particular task might be inappropriately applied (e.g.,
213 Hilton, 1995; Schwarz, 1996).
214 Like Stanovich and West, we also emphasize the relevance of individual diﬀer-
215 ences in relation to causal induction and Bayesian decision making by exploring
216 the possible connection between peoples use of base-rate information in both do-
217 mains. The evidence of non-normative behavior in both research domains suggests
218 that people encounter problems in tasks where they should incorporate base-rate
219 information and that, particularly in decision making tasks, individuals vary accord-
220 ing to whether or not they integrate such information.
221 Thus far, there has, to our knowledge, been no empirical work that compares cau-
222 sal contingency judgments with responses to decision making tasks. However, one
223 connection between causal learning and decision making that has been explored is
224 in the context of discounting (Kelley, 1973; Morris & Larrick, 1995; Oppenheimer,
225 2004; Reeder, Vonk, Ronk, Ham, & Lawrence, 2004) which refers to the phenome-
226 non in which people show biased behavior when making a causal attribution in light
227 of new information. Despite the fact that this work is based on the discounting prin-
228 ciple and its common application in causal and decision making domains, there is no
229 empirical comparison of how people use this principle in each of the domains.
230 In the present study, we investigated whether there are individual diﬀerences in the
231 use of base-rate information in causal learning and how these relate to the use of
232 base-rate information in Bayesian decision making. We used a causal learning task
233 which is a modiﬁed version of a task described by Shanks (2004) and standard
234 Bayesian decision making tasks: two probabilistic estimation problems (Kahneman
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235 and Tverskys Cab problem, causal and non-causal versions), and two base-rate
236 inference tasks (Doherty and Mynatts Disease problem, causal and non-causal
237 versions).
238 The ﬁrst objective of this study was to identify patterns in the causal judgments
239 people gave in the four conditions of the causal learning task. This was based on
240 the extent to which judgments were inﬂuenced by base-rate information [i.e., the
241 probability of the eﬀect in the absence of the cause, pðej:cÞ]; the precise details of
242 the procedure used are presented below in the results section headed weightings
243 of causal judgments. From this, the second objective was to examine whether par-
244 ticipants who incorporated base-rate information into their probabilistic estimates,
245 or who made inferences that involved base-rate information, also gave causal judg-
246 ments that reﬂect a greater inﬂuence of pðej:cÞ. Conversely, participants who gave
247 probabilistic estimates that suggested base-rate neglect and who drew inferences in
248 which the base-rate information was ignored were, in turn, expected to give causal
249 judgments that indicated that they had not been inﬂuenced by this information when
250 making estimates of causal covariation. Finally, the inclusion of causal and non-
251 causal versions of typical decision making tasks enables a further hypothesis to be
252 tested. Bar-Hillel (1980) claimed that causal versions of decision making tasks such
253 as those devised by Kahneman and Tversky can facilitate performance, as compared
254 with standard non-causal versions, and we aimed to test this conjecture.
255 2. Method
256 2.1. Participants and apparatus
257 Fifty-two students from University College London volunteered to take part in
258 the experiment and were paid £5 for their involvement. Of the students that took
259 part, ﬁfteen were ﬁrst year undergraduates studying psychology, and each was
260 screened for prior experience with the tests included in the study. Participants were
261 tested individually and were presented with the causal learning task ﬁrst, which was
262 run on Dell Optiplex computers. The experimental programme used was adapted
263 from studies described in Shanks (2004) and was written in Visual Basic 6.0.
264 Although, we did not counterbalance the order of presentation of the causal and
265 decision making tasks, the requirements and context of the learning task were suﬃ-
266 ciently diﬀerent from the paper and pencil tasks for this not to be a serious concern.
267 However, the order of presentation of the four remaining paper and pencil decision
268 making tasks was randomized for each participant because the structure of the tasks
269 was similar.
270 2.2. Design and procedure
271 The causal learning task included four conditions (1–4) each of which was 80 tri-
272 als long (see Table 2). In the second and third column of Table 2, are two numbers,
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273 the ﬁrst of these referring to the value of DP and the second to the value of the power
274 measure P. Presented in the two rightmost columns are the values of p(ejc) and
275 pðej:cÞ, respectively, which are based on the cell frequencies in Columns 4–7, and
276 which were used to calculate DP and P. In conditions 1 and 4 the cell frequencies
277 were exactly the same and they were used to generate a low value for DP and a high
278 value for P. The rationale for incorporating two identical conditions was to examine
279 the consistency of peoples causal judgments. In the remaining two conditions the
280 values of DP and P were similar; in condition 2, DP and P were low, and in condition
281 3 they were both high. Varying the values of DP and P in the four conditions allowed
282 us to estimate base-rate usage for each participant via a method which will be de-
283 scribed shortly. Participants were presented all four conditions, but the order of pre-
284 sentation of the conditions was counterbalanced across participants according to a
285 Latin square design.
286 In the initial phase participants were presented with a set of instructions (see
287 Appendix A: Causal learning instructions) along with ﬁve practice trials. In each
288 trial participants were presented with a graphic image denoting the presence or ab-
289 sence of radiation, after which they would respond using mouse activated buttons
290 either ‘‘YES, the mutation is going to occur’’, or ‘‘NO, the mutation is not going to
291 occur’’. An image of a mutated or non-mutated butterﬂy then appeared together
292 with the word ‘‘Yes’’ or ‘‘No’’ indicating its actual state. After 40 and 80 trials par-
293 ticipants were asked ‘‘To what extent does radiation cause mutation?’’ Responses to
294 this question were given on a 0–100 scale, the extreme ends of which were labeled
295 ‘‘Radiation does not cause mutation’’ and ‘‘Radiation causes mutation’’ with the
296 center point being labeled ‘‘Radiation is a moderate cause of mutation’’. In addi-
297 tion, participants were asked to give a conﬁdence rating of their judgment on a
298 scale ranging from ‘‘Not at all conﬁdent’’ to ‘‘Mildly conﬁdent’’ to ‘‘Very
299 conﬁdent’’.
300 2.3. Weightings of causal judgments
301 To examine the relationship between judgments of causal strength and judgments
302 in the four decision making tasks, we weighted the power PC model and the DP
303 model, and participants mean weights from each model were then correlated with
304 performance in the decision making tasks.
Table 2
Cell frequencies, contingency (DP), power (P) and values of p(ejc) and pðej:cÞ in each condition
Condition Model Cell frequencies Model term
DP P A B C D p(ejc) pðej:cÞ
1. Low DP, high P 0.35 0.78 36 4 22 18 0.9 0.55
2. Low DP, low P 0.35 0.35 14 26 0 40 0.35 0.0
3. High DP, high P 0.70 0.78 32 8 4 36 0.8 0.1
4. Low DP, high P 0.35 0.78 36 4 22 18 0.9 0.55
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305 The procedure used is as follows. In the case of the DP model, for each condition1
306 [1 (low DP), 3 (high DP), and 4 (low DP)] we added a weight ranging between 0 and 1
307 (in increments of 0.05) to the value of pðej:cÞ, and calculated a new value of DP
308 according to the equation:
DP ¼ pðejcÞ  wpðej:cÞ ð3Þ
312 For example, in condition 1 (low DP) the value of pðej:cÞ is 0.55 (see Table 2), hence
313 a weight of 0 changed the value of DP to 0.9 while a weight of 1 changed it to 0.35. If
314 a participant gave a judgment of 90 in condition 1 (low DP), then their weighting of
315 pðej:cÞ would be 0. For each participant the judgment they gave for condition 1(low
316 DP) was compared with the range of predicted judgments for that condition accord-
317 ing to Eq. (3). An optimal weight was selected that minimized the discrepancy be-
318 tween their judgment and the prediction of Eq. (3). The same procedure was then
319 repeated for judgments in conditions 3 (high DP) and 4 (low DP). Thus, each partic-
320 ipant was assigned an optimal weight for each of the three conditions, and these
321 weights were then averaged to give a ﬁnal minimized absolute weight which was used
322 in later analyses as an estimate of base-rate sensitivity.
323 To ﬁnd the weightings of participants judgments in the three conditions [1(high
324 P), 3 (high P), and 4 (high P)] according to the PC model, we used the following
325 equation:
P ¼ pðejcÞ  wpðej:cÞ
1 wpðej:cÞ ð4Þ
329 Using the same procedure as that used for comparing judgments according to
330 weighted DP, each participants judgments were compared with weighted P to ﬁnd
331 the closest ﬁt between actual and predicted judgments. Each participants three
332 weights corresponding to the three conditions were again averaged to give a ﬁnal
333 minimized absolute weight which was also used in later analyses.
334 In the causal learning task, we included a condition [condition 2 (low DP/low P)]
335 in which the value of pðej:cÞ is equal to 0 (see Table 2); adding weights to pðej:cÞ in
336 condition 2 (low DP/high P) does not change the value of DP or P. Therefore, the
337 reason, we included condition 2 was to permit an estimate of the weighting of
338 p(ejc) which we predicted would not correlate with base-rate usage in the decision
339 making tasks.
340 Speciﬁcally, we conducted a similar procedure as described above using weighted
341 DP and P, but this time p(ejc) was weighted. The minimized absolute weights from
342 these calculations were also used as a control in later analyses when correlating re-
343 sponses from decision making tasks with the causal learning task. In order to dem-
344 onstrate a genuine relationship between individuals usage of base-rate information
345 in decision making and causal learning tasks, we would not expect to ﬁnd correla-
346 tions between responses to decision making tasks and weights associated with p(ejc).
1 Condition 2 was not included because the actual value of pðej:cÞ for both models equalled 0, and so it
is meaningless to ask how participants weighted base-rate information in this condition; however, we did
include this condition in a diﬀerent analysis discussed later in this section.
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347 One might ask why we do not predict that weightings of p(ejc) (according to either
348 normative model) should correspond with responses in decision making tasks; for
349 instance, the p(djh) option in the probability inference problems is equivalent to
350 p(ejc). Predicting a correspondence between p(ejc) and responses to decision making
351 task rests on the assumption that people fully incorporate base-rate information but
352 vary according to the extent they weight p(ejc). This is at odds with evidence showing
353 that people actually vary according to the extent that they neglect base-rate informa-
354 tion (e.g., Bar-Hillel, 1980; Doherty & Mynatt, 1990; Fischhoﬀ & Bar-Hillel, 1984;
355 Tversky & Kahneman, 1982). It is for this reason, that we only predict a correspon-
356 dence between the weighting of pðej:cÞ in both causal models and performance in
357 the decision making tasks.
358 Thus for each participant an optimal weight was computed so as to minimize the
359 discrepancy between judgments and the predictions of Eq. (3), and this procedure
360 was then repeated with Eq. (4). Finally, weights were calculated again according
361 to these equations, but with weightings on p(ejc) rather than pðej:cÞ. The four min-
362 imized absolute weights were used in later correlation analyses with responses from
363 the decision making tasks.
364 2.4. Decision making tasks
365 Participants were given a booklet with four decision making tasks. Although no
366 time restrictions were imposed, participants were told not to spend too long on each
367 task; the mean time spent on each task was approximately 2 min. Each of the two
368 sets of tasks (probability estimates, probability inference) included a non-causal
369 and causal version. The original instructions from Kahneman and Tverskys
370 (1973) non-causal and Bar-Hillels (1980) causal problem were used for the probabil-
371 ity estimate tasks (see Appendix A: Probability estimate problems). In both tasks
372 probability estimates were given on a scale between 0 and 100. Doherty and Mynatts
373 (1990) causal base-rate inference task was used along with a non-causal version (see
374 Appendix A: Probability inference problems).
375 3. Results
376 3.1. Causal learning task: causal judgments
377 Starting with the judgment data ﬁrst, Fig. 1 presents the mean ratings for each
378 condition after 40 and 80 trials, and indicates that judgments did not change between
379 these stages. This trend was conﬁrmed using an ANOVA with condition (conditions
380 1–4) · block (40, 80 trials) as within-subject factors, which revealed no signiﬁcant
381 main eﬀect of block and no block · condition interaction, F < 1.
382 All remaining analyses of judgment data are based on the average of the ratings
383 given after 40 and 80 trials. A one-way ANOVA indicated that there was a highly
384 signiﬁcant diﬀerence between judgments in the four conditions, F(3, 204) = 40.84,
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385 p < 0.0005. Paired sample t-tests revealed that there were signiﬁcant diﬀerences in
386 judgments between each pair of conditions (p < 0.05), with the exception of condi-
387 tions 1 (low DP/high P) and 4 (low DP/high P) which are identical (t < 1). These ﬁnd-
388 ings are consistent with those from experiments described by Shanks (2004) on which
389 this task was based.
390 3.2. Causal learning task: conﬁdence ratings
391 Fig. 2 presents the mean conﬁdence ratings for each condition after 40 and 80 tri-
392 als and shows that these ratings did not change between these blocks. A one-way
393 ANOVA comparing conﬁdence ratings in the ﬁnal trial block for each condition re-
394 vealed no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in ratings between the four conditions, F(3, 204) =
395 1.32, p = 0.27.
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Fig. 1. Mean causal judgments (±SE) at both judgment periods for each condition in the causal learning
task.
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Fig. 2. Mean conﬁdence ratings (±SE) at both judgment periods for each condition in the learning task.
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396 3.3. Weightings
397 Fig. 3 presents the frequency of participants ﬁnal minimized absolute weighting
398 of pðej:cÞ according to the DP and Power PC models.
399 For both of the models, a weight of 1 indicates that participants are consistent
400 with the (unweighted) normative model. The ﬁgure also shows that most participants
401 deviated from the normative models showing a tendency to underweight pðej:cÞ.
402 Fig. 3 suggests that the distribution of weights diﬀered between the models, with
403 weightings according to the DP model skewed towards the lower end of the scale.
404 A Wilcoxon signed ranks test revealed a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the absolute
405 weightings of the DP and PC models, t(51) = 5.67, p < 0.0005.
406 3.4. Decision making tasks: probability estimate problems
407 Participants performed poorly in both the Cab and Suicide problems, with only
408 21% of participants giving correct estimates of 41 (+/10) in the cab problem, and
409 13% estimating 43 (+/10) in the suicide problem. Thus, the causally framed version
410 did not attenuate base-rate neglect. The modal estimate (80) given by 35% of partic-
411 ipants in response to the cab problem was consistent with that reported in Kahneman
412 and Tverskys (1973) original study. For the suicide problem the modal estimate was
413 75 and was made by 33% of participants, consistent with Bar-Hillels (1980) study.
414 A correlation analysis between estimates given in both tasks revealed a signiﬁcant
415 relationship, suggesting that participants responded similarly to them, r(52) = 0.41,
416 p < 0.005. Participants estimates from the cab and suicide problems were then cor-
417 related with their weights in the causal learning task. The analysis revealed that esti-
418 mates according to weighted DP correlated positively with actual estimates in the
419 suicide problem, r(52) = 0.28, p = 0.046. No other correlations between probability
420 estimates and weights estimated from power approached signiﬁcance. As expected,
421 there were no correlations between probability estimates and weights assigned to
422 p(ejc).
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Fig. 3. Frequency of weightings of pðej:cÞ averaged across conditions 1, 3 and 4 for the Power PC and DP
models.
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423 3.5. Decision making tasks: probability inference problem
424 Participants tended to perform poorly in both inference tasks, with only 6% of par-
425 ticipants choosing the correct card combination [p(h), p(djh), pðdj:hÞ] in the non-cau-
426 sal bird problem, and only 10% responding correctly in the causal disease problem.
427 This also suggests that, as with the probability estimate tasks, the causal version did
428 not facilitate correct performance. However, in contrast to the probability estimate
429 tasks, the modal response in the two inference tasks diﬀered. In the non-causal prob-
430 lem, approximately half (52%) of the participants chose the combination p(h) and
431 p(djh), while the next most popular response was the selection of p(djh) made by
432 14% of participants, followed by p(djh) and pðdj:hÞwhich was made by 12% of partic-
433 ipants. Choices in the causal version converged with those reported by Stanovich and
434 West (1998) and Doherty and Mynatt (1990). The modal response in the causally
435 framed disease problem was p(djh) and pðdj:hÞ and this accounted for 44% of partic-
436 ipants choices in the present study (cf. 36%of Stanovich andWests sample and 30%of
437 Doherty and Mynatts). The second most frequent choice was p(djh) made by 19% of
438 participants, followed by p(h) and pðdj:hÞ made by 11.5% of participants. To better
439 illustrate the diﬀerence in card choices between the two inference tasks, Table 3 shows,
440 for each of the three key cards p(h), p(djh) and pðdj:hÞ, the proportion of participants
441 who responded with a card combination that included that card.
442 The most striking trend suggested in Table 3 is the sharp increase in the choice of
443 base-rate p(h) information in the non-causal problem compared with the causal
444 problem, and the decrease in the inclusion of the p(djh) card in the non-causal ver-
445 sion. There is little to distinguish these tasks with the exception of the actual context,
446 and this suggests that the context did have a dramatic eﬀect on the way base-rate
447 information was perceived. A simple scoring scheme was used to classify card selec-
448 tion: for each of the cards p(h), p(djh), pðdj:hÞ participants scored 1 for its selection
449 and 0 for its exclusion, and from this, we examined patterns in the card choices
450 made in both inference tasks. Because the variables are binary, we use a u (phi) coef-
451 ﬁcient which is equivalent to Pearsons R but is the appropriate correlation coeﬃ-
452 cient for dichotomous variables. The u coeﬃcient revealed a signiﬁcant negative
453 correlation between the selection of the p(h) card in the two tasks, u(1) = 0.36,
454 p < 0.0005, and a positive correlation between the selection of the pðdj:hÞ card,
455 u(1) = 0.34, p < 0.0005.
456 The scores based on card choices in both inference tasks were correlated with par-
457 ticipants weights in the causal learning task. A signiﬁcant relationship was found be-
458 tween selection of the pðdj:hÞ card in the inference tasks and causal estimates when
Table 3
Percentage of the sample in each of the probability inference tasks that included p(h), pð:hÞ, p(d/h), and
pðd=:hÞ in their choices
Options p(h) pð:hÞ p(d/h) pðd=:hÞ
Disease 28.8 9.6 88.8 69.2
Bird 65.4 0 78.8 34.6
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459 pðej:cÞ was weighted in both the DP and P models. Speciﬁcally, there was a strong
460 positive correlation between DP and the selection of the pðdj:hÞ card in the disease
461 problem, r(52) = 0.38, p = 0.006, and DP and the selection of the pðdj:hÞ card in the
462 bird problem, r(52) = 0.30, p = 0.03. There was also a strong positive correlation be-
463 tween P and the selection of the pðdj:hÞ card in the bird problem, r(52) = 0.37,
464 p = 0.007, and between P and the selection of the pðdj:hÞ card in the disease prob-
465 lem, r(52) = 0.29, p = 0.04. No correlations were found between card choices and
466 p(ejc) weights.
467 Overall, our analyses suggest that participants weighting of base-rate information
468 is consistent across causal learning and decision making tasks; thus, we were able to
469 demonstrate an underlying relationship between these domains, which until now had
470 remained unexplored.
471 4. General discussion
472 The evidence from this study can be summarized as follows: ﬁrst, we found that
473 individuals diﬀer according to the way they weight base-rate information in a causal
474 learning task and that the way they do this corresponds to performance in decision
475 making tasks. Second, as a control we demonstrated that only the weighting of
476 pðej:cÞ in both models corresponded to performance in the decision making tasks,
477 and not the weighting of p(ejc). Third, weighting DP corresponded more closely to
478 participants performance in the decision making tasks than Power PC. Fourth, deci-
479 sion making tasks that were framed in a causal context did not facilitate correct per-
480 formance as compared with standard non-causal versions.
481 So, what does the evidence imply about peoples ability to use base rates in gen-
482 eral? To begin, we must stress that this study is exploratory in nature, and as such,
483 the conclusions are drawn with some caution. However, we were able to show that
484 people consistently varied in their use of base-rate information across causal learning
485 and decision making tasks. We are, however, tentative in suggesting that the tasks
486 used in the present study index peoples general ability to use base-rate information,
487 since there are issues surrounding the framings of the classic Bayesian decision mak-
488 ing tasks used here (e.g., Kohler, 1996; Maachi, 1995). This is clearly illustrated by
489 comparing the modal responses to the probability inference tasks, in which the
490 underlying structure of the tasks were identical, and only the context they referred
491 to diﬀered. Although framed in a causal context, there was more evidence of base-
492 rate neglect in the Disease problem as compared with the Bird problem. This is at
493 odds with Bar-Hillels (1980) claim that framing standard decision making tasks in
494 causal contexts can help to overcome base-rate neglect. However, Bar-Hillel
495 (1980) also claimed that peoples inability to integrate base-rate information is
496 apparent in tasks where the indicant and base-rate information is not made relevant
497 to the reasoner, and causal contexts are only one example in which their relevancy
498 can be increased. Consistent with this, we were able to show that in a non-causal
499 framing of a probability inference task in which the indicant and base-rate informa-
500 tion were made relevant, base-rate neglect was attenuated.
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501 The evidence from this study suggests that people may in fact be performing opti-
502 mally according to their understanding of decision making tasks, or given the cogni-
503 tive limitations under which they are working. Moreover, recent research on causal
504 induction also shows that, in this case, the framing of the question used to elicit cau-
505 sal judgments can have marked aﬀects on the types of responses given (e.g., Buehner
506 et al., 2003; Shanks, 2004). Therefore, the evidence from the present study can also
507 be viewed in the context of the three departures from normative standards identiﬁed
508 by Stanovich and West (2000). We are inclined towards the position that given the
509 potential ambiguity of the framing of many of the tasks used in this study, the ﬁnd-
510 ings suggest that people vary in their construal of the task requirements and the way
511 in which they weight base-rate information, but they are consistent as to how they
512 use this information across diﬀerent task domains.
513 We also demonstrated that weightings of participants causal judgments according
514 to the DP model more accurately tracked their use of base-rate information in deci-
515 sion making tasks compared with the PC model. The evidence showed that absolute
516 weightings of pðej:cÞ according to the DP model were lower than the PC model, sug-
517 gesting that base-rates were undervalued consistent with the ﬁndings from the deci-
518 sion making tasks. The DP model is an expression of covariation whereas the PC
519 model normalizes DP by the base-rate of the eﬀect to express causation. Because
520 of the normalization procedure, the PC model restricts the range of values between
521 P (when pðej:cÞ has a weight of 1) and p(ejc) (when pðej:cÞ has a weight of 0). For
522 example, in conditions 1 and 4, when w = 1 for pðej:cÞ the value of P = 0.78 and
523 DP = 0.35 and when w = 0 for pðej:cÞ the value of P = 0.90 and DP = 0.90. Thus,
524 according to the weighting of pðej:cÞ of the DP model the range of values it accom-
525 modates is wider and so it is more sensitive than the PC model to the range of weigh-
526 tings of base-rate information in causal and decision making tasks. Another possible
527 reason for the better tracking of the DP model to decision making behavior is that it
528 might more accurately reﬂect the process of human covariation judgment than the
529 PC model. There has been extensive debate about the relative merits of these models.
530 Although arguments can be presented favoring each, there are good reasons to ques-
531 tion the empirical and theoretical status of the PC model (Perales & Shanks, 2003;
532 Shanks, 2004; see Buehner et al., 2003, for a contrasting view).
533 4.1. Future directions
534 The evidence from this study strongly suggests that Tbase-rate information in a
535 cause–eﬀect learning task and decision making problems is treated in the same way.
536 Currently, Bayesian reasoning is coming to the fore in research on causal structure
537 learning in which there are multiple cause–eﬀect relationships (e.g., is insomnia the
538 cause of stress and depression or is depression a common eﬀect of stress and insom-
539 nia?) (Cooper & Herskovits, 1992; Steyvers, Tenenbaum, Wagenmakers, & Blum,
540 2003; Tenenbaum & Griﬃths, 2001). Formal models (Pearl, 2000; Spirtes, Glymour,
541 & Scheines, 2000) have been developed to capture the probabilistic dependencies pres-
542 ent in a set of data and their relation to causal structures that could have generated
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543 that data. Many recent studies show that people generally take advantage of informa-
544 tion about causal structure when making probability estimations or causal strength
545 judgments (Waldmann & Hagmayer, 2001). Moreover, they beneﬁt most by making
546 interventions that disrupt causal chains rather than passively observing trials in which
547 information about diﬀerent causal structures is presented (Lagnado & Sloman, 2004).
548 Like the evidence reported in this study, there is evidence to suggest that Bayesian
549 reasoning is incorporated in causal structure learning and that people diﬀer in the
550 way they do this. For example, Steyvers et al. (2003) recently presented an account
551 of peoples inferences of causal structure from a Bayesian perspective. They propose
552 that as Bayesian hypothesis testers, people have a set of possible causal models to
553 explain a particular observation in the world and that depending on their prior
554 knowledge or particular biases they have, they evaluate relevant hypotheses for
555 the one that best explains the observed data. From this they can make inferences
556 about the causal structure and where best to alter some aspect of the structure in or-
557 der to understand the cause–eﬀect links. In their study they report three diﬀerent
558 strategies that people used when learning to discriminate between two causal struc-
559 tures. Those that used a strategy that integrated information across trials reliably
560 made the optimal decision as dictated by the likelihood ratio. The next best were
561 one trial Bayesians because, although sensitive to the likelihood ratio, they failed
562 to integrate information across trials. The worst performers failed to give judgments
563 consistent with the likelihood ratio or examining data across trials. The ﬁndings give
564 some indication of the variability of peoples Bayesian reasoning in a causal inference
565 task, but in particular, this evidence suggests that for some, the kinds of heuristics or
566 deliberative Bayesian strategies that they employ come surprisingly close to those of
567 a rational statistical inference model.
568 Given the strongBayesian reasoning component that is implicated in learning about
569 causal structures discussed here, it is plausible that the diﬀerent kinds of strategies that
570 people develop in complex cause–eﬀect learning tasks should also correspond to their
571 behavior in single cause-event learning tasks and decision making tasks. One possibil-
572 ity then, following the ﬁndings of the present study, would be to investigate whether
573 people are consistent in the way they weight base-rate information across causal struc-
574 ture learning, single cause–eﬀect learning tasks, and decision making tasks.
575 In conclusion, this study examined reasoning across related cognitive domains
576 and has provided evidence that people vary as to how they weight the probability
577 of the eﬀect in the absence of the cause in a causal learning task, and that this is also
578 indicative of the way in which they make probability estimates and inferences from
579 Bayesian decision making tasks.
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586 Appendix A
587 Causal learning instructions
588 Imagine you are working in a laboratory and you want to ﬁnd out whether certain
589 types of radiation cause or prevent a speciﬁc genetic mutation in butterﬂies DNA.
590 During this task you will see laboratory records from four studies. In each study,
591 you will see information about administering one type of radiation to one species
592 of insect. In one study, Gonepteryx Formosana were irradiated with U256 nuclear
593 radiation, Ixias Pyrene were irradiated with P290, in a third Catopsilia Scylla were
594 irradiated with Z210, and in a forth study Calliithea Leprieuri were irradiated with
595 N235. In each study, some butterﬂies received nuclear radiation and some did not. In
596 a test given 5 min later, the butterﬂies were examined for a speciﬁc genetic mutation
597 at a particular DNA locus. Of course, mutations sometimes occur spontaneously in
598 insects not exposed to nuclear radiation. What you must decide is whether and how
599 strongly the radiation can independently cause this particular mutation. There are 80
600 butterﬂies in each study. The likelihood that mutations occur on their own (without
601 radiation) is the same in all 80 butterﬂies in each study. Half of the butterﬂies in each
602 study were randomly assigned to a group receiving nuclear radiation and half to a
603 group not receiving any radiation. Each record tells you whether the butterﬂy was
604 exposed to the relevant nuclear radiation or not. You will then be asked to predict
605 whether or not the butterﬂies DNA will show a genetic mutation in the test given
606 5 min later. When you have made your prediction you will be told whether the muta-
607 tion was found or not. Use this feedback to try to ﬁnd out whether the radiation
608 really causes mutations. Although initially you will have to guess, by the end you will
609 be an expert! At regular intervals during each study you will be asked to estimate the
610 degree to which the radiation causes mutations, and to state how conﬁdent you are
611 in your estimate. Further instructions will explain at the appropriate time how to
612 make these estimates. You can now try some practice trials. GOOD LUCK!
613 Probability estimate problems
614 Cab problem
615 A cab was involved in a hit and run accident at night. Two cab companies, the
616 Green and the Blue, operate in the city. You are given the following data:
617 (a) Although the two companies are roughly equal in size, 85% of the cabs acci-
618 dents in the city involve Green cabs and 15% involve Blue cabs.
619 (b) A witness identiﬁed the cab as Blue. The court tested the reliability of the wit-
620 ness under the same circumstances that existed on the night of the accident and
621 concluded that the witness correctly identiﬁed each one of the two colours 80%
622 of the time and failed 20% of the time.
623
624
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625 What is the probability that the cab involved in the accident was Blue rather than
626 Green?
627 Please write your probability estimate in the box below
628 Estimate between 0% and 100%
629 Suicide problem
630 A study was done on causes of suicide among young adults (aged 25–35). It was
631 found that the percentage of suicides is three times larger among single people than
632 among married people. In this age group, 80% are married and 20% are single.
633 Of 100 cases of suicide among people aged 25–35, how many of the people would
634 you estimate were single?
635 Please write your estimate in the box below
636 Estimate between 0% and 100%
637 Bare-rate inference problems
638 Disease problem
639 Imagine you are a doctor. A patient comes to you with a red rash on his ﬁngers.
640 What information would you want in order to diagnose whether the patient had the
641 disease ‘‘Digirosa’’?
642 Below are four pieces of information that may or may not be relevant to the
643 diagnosis.
644 Please indicate by ticking the boxes below the piece/pieces of information that are
645 necessary to make the diagnosis, but only tick information that is necessary to do so.
646 1. Percentage of people without Digirosa who have a red rash.
647 2. Percentage of people with Digirosa.
648 3. Percentage of people without Digirosa.
649 4. Percentage of people with Digirosa who have a red rash.
650
651 Bird problem
652 You are a bird watcher and have found a nest with pink speckled eggs. You are
653 trying to ﬁnd out whether they belong to the Blue Bellied Chaﬃnch. You need to
654 consult your pocket guidebook to help you make the classiﬁcation that the eggs
655 do belong to the Blue Bellied Chaﬃnch. Below are four pieces of information that
656 may or may not be relevant to make your classiﬁcation. Please tick the piece/pieces
657 of information that are necessary to make your classiﬁcation, but only tick informa-
658 tion that is necessary to do so.
659 1. Percentage of Blue Bellied Chaﬃnch without pink speckled eggs.
660 2. Percentage of Blue Bellied Chaﬃnch with pink speckled eggs.
661 3. Percentage of Blue Bellied Chaﬃnch in the area.
662 4. Percentage of Blue Bellied Chaﬃnch not in the area.
663
4
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